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INTRODUCTION
In 1974-1976, ECON Incorporated, of Princeton, New Jersey, con-
ducted a series of studies for the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), Office of Applications. These studies dealt with
estimation and analysis of benefits to be derived from improving worldwide
wheat crop information through a remote sensing system. ECON developed two
different econometric models in its series of studies—one is identified as the
Bradford-Kelejian-Andrews Model of The Value of Information for Crop Fore-
casting in a Market System; the second is the Worldwide Wheat Crop
Information Benefits Model, authored primarily by Dr. Klaus P. Heiss. The
reports on these analyses are, of necessity, complex, highly detailed, and
difficult for the layman to follow.
In addition, through a contract with Battelle's Columbus
Laboratories, NASA initiated independent reviews of the ECON work. Three
reviewers, well recognized econometricians, were selected, and carried
out their critique of the ECON work in February and March, 1976. They
were:
Reviewer
Professor Lester Thurow
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Dr. Ira Horowitz
U.S. Department of Justice
(on leave from the University of
Florida)
Dr. C. W. J. Granger
University of California,
San Diego
Model
Bradford-Kelejian-Andrews Model,
and Worldwide Wheat Model
Bradford-Kelejian-Andrews Model
Worldwide Wheat Model
This Battelle report summarizes the ECON work and the results
of the independent reviews. It attempts to put this information into
layman's terms and to present the benefits that can realistically be ex-
pected from a LANDSAT-type remote sensing system. Further, it presents
the mechanisms by which these benefits can be expected to accrue.
Topically, this report first deals with the benefits, including
the nature of expected information improvements, how and why they can lead
to benefits to society, and the estimated magnitude of the expected bene-
fits. Secondly, the report presents a brief description of the ECON
models, how they work, their results, and a summary of the pertinent aspects
of each review.
Briefly, the ECON analyses show that substantial benefits will
accrue from implementation of an improved wheat crop information system
based on remote sensing. The specific estimates differ, but are substantially
in excess of estimated system costs. Basically, these benefits will be
derived from
— Improved estimates and forecasts of wheat supplies
— Somewhat reduced wheat prices resulting from reduced
uncertainty, somewhat reduced production costs, and a
different pattern of levels and dispersion of inventory
holdings
Increased exports of U.S. wheat.
These benefits will flow both to U.S. consumers and to consumers in the
rest of the world. The benefits to the U.S. will be substantial, but the
benefits to the rest of.the world will be much greater, because of the
current poor state of crop information in most other countries.
The reviewers offered suggestions for improvement and expansion
of the ECON work, but generally agreed that these are well-performed ana-
lyses that have developed reasonable estimates of benefits. One exception
was Professor Thurow, who had reservations about the Worldwide Wheat
Model.
BENEFITS FROM IMPROVED WHEAT CROP INFORMATION
Nature of Potential Improvements
The proposed next stage of the LANDSAT program is currently ex-
pected to provide
— Improved accuracy of land area measurements, with resolu-
tion to approximately 5 acres
Increased frequency of coverage; every 9 days with a 2-
satellite system (depending, of course, on cloud cover)
— Improved ability to differentiate among crops
— Faster data availability.
This, then, translates into improved worldwide crop production area infor-
mation to be collected and disseminated more frequently than with current
systems. This area information is expected to be used by systems being
developed in the joint USDA-NASA Large Area Crop Information Experiment
(LACIE), along with other information, to produce estimates or forecasts
of crop yields and thus estimates of total production for major producing
areas of the world.
Wheat has been chosen as the target crop for experimentation and
for analysis of benefits. Wheat is one of the major crops of the United
States, and is a major product of international commerce. The United
States is the world's largest exporter of wheat, sending on the order of
two-thirds of its production to the world market each year, thus providing
some 50 percent of the wheat that moves in international commerce. Wheat
also is produced in many other parts of the world. Canada, France,
Australia, and Argentina are principal exporters, and there is some pro-
duction for domestic use in virtually all regions of the world. Some
countries, such as Japan, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Nether-
lands are relatively consistent deficit producers and, therefore, consistent
importers of wheat. Import demands for most countries, however, vary
considerably from year to year, depending on the level of domestic pro-
duction, the state of the country's economy, and many other factors. Total
world demand for wheat tends to be relatively consistent with secular
trends from year to year, but the world supply varies considerably de-
pending on weather, other natural occurrences, and producer decisions.
Current Information Systems
Current sources of information on wheat production include:
— The Statistical Reporting Service of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA), which provides monthly forecasts of U.S.
wheat production throughout the growing season, plus pre-
liminary and final estimates of actual total production at
the end of the season. These forecasts and estimates are
based on a comprehensive statistical sampling/survey process.
— The Foreign Agricultural Service and the Economic Research
Service of the USDA provide periodic outlook information
on U.S. and key foreign wheat production, along with annual
estimates of wheat production by country. This information
is based in part on analyses of the Statistical Reporting
Service surveys of the U.S., plus information from U.S.
Agricultural Attaches in other countries and various
other sources.
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
which publishes annual estimates of crop production on a
country-by-country basis using information provided by in-
dividual countries plus observations of U.N. analysts based
in the region. •
Individual country statistics which vary widely in coverage,
periodicity, and reliability—some key countries, such as
the USSR, publish little or no information.
Private grain trade forecasting and estimating systems, in-
cluding individual company estimates and the Chicago Board
of Trade statistics—availability of which varies because
of the proprietary nature of some of the information.
The information and forecasts produced by the USDA on U.S.
domestic production are considered to be the most extensive and reliable
publicly available statistics. These forecasts are generated from
acreage (area) information developed in a monthly large-scale statistical
survey by crop reporting district throughout the United States. Yield is
determined separately based on yield trends, assumptions regarding weather,
plus sample measurements of disease and pest losses, and "status" of the
crop during the growing season. The USDA has a goal of keeping its year-
end estimates of national annual crop production (for major crops such
as wheat) within a tolerance of 2 percent. The ECON analysis of actual
errors in USDA forecasts and estimates of the U.S. wheat crop indicate
that the actual error for forecasts and estimates in the period 1959-
1974, has been over 8 percent for the early part of the season (May and
June). This error reduces to under 2 percent by the end of the winter
wheat harvest season (August and September), and to 0.68 percent at the
end of the crop year.
The major types or sources of errors that now exist in the USDA
system include:
Before Harvest Forecasts
— Crop measurement errors for both acreage and yield
— Time lag between measurement and published forecast
— Changes in weather, etc., i.e., nature
— The difference between planted and harvested acreages
Statistical "error", which results from the process
used.*
After Harvest Estimates
-- Crop measurement errors for both acreage and yield
— Time lag until reported.
This process has evolved over many years, is highly scientific in nature,
and is being continually updated and revised to reduce errors. However,
even with this effort, some, private companies feel the need to augment
* This does not imply that the USDA uses an incorrect procedure, only
that statistical error is present in all statistical sampling pro-
cesses, primarily because one is measuring less than the total population.
8the USDA information with their own sources and estimating/forecasting
procedures.
For foreign crops, the information picture is quite different.
The process of gathering and reporting information on actual and potential
wheat (as well as other crop) production varies tremendously from country
to country. Often this is not a routine nor a scientific process as it
is in the United States. Furthermore, as ECON Incorporated points out,
there is no reasonable way to measure error because it is difficult to
determine the true level of crop production in many countries even long
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after harvest. Some countries, such as the Soviet Union, publish very
little or no information, which in that particular case creates problems,
because they have been "in and out" of the market in a substantial way
over the last few years. The USDA is beginning to work out processes with
their countreparts in the USSR to try to provide some advance information
on crop production. However, the success of these efforts is yet to be
seen. Also, most of the companies in the international grain trade have
their own processes to develop private forecasts and estimates of key crop
production in selected parts of the world.
Improvements with Remote Sensing
Given current levels of technology for enhancement and interpre-
tation of remote imagery, area measurements can be made with virtually any
desired level of accuracy if cost is not a consideration. Cost effective
individual field area measurements can be made with errors of no more
than 5 percent. If, then, an efficient sampling technique is developed
and applied to reduce the impact of cloud cover and of pure sampling error,
crop area measurements of 95 percent accuracy can be obtained.
The problem of planted versus harvested acreage still remains.
Early in the production season for any given region, the crop area measured
will be planted acreage. During the growing season, decisions may be made
to abandon or change the cropping pattern of any given field, for a variety
of reasons, and some acreage will be lost from natural occurrences. Pre-
sumably, the LANDSAT system will make continued observation of planted
acreages until harvest is complete, thus allowing adjustments to be made
in forecasts of harvested acreage throughout the season.
Thus, area measurements and forecasts can be made, using remote
sensing inputs, much more accurately than existing systems allow for pro-
duction areas outside of the United States. For the United States, area
accuracies are relatively comparable, but the remote sensing technology
may allow for larger samples to be taken at a lower cost.
On the yield side of the production forecasting equation
(Production = Yield x Acreage), the planned remote sensing information to
be derived from LANDSAT will provide little if any input. The LACIE ex-
periment is to develop systems for providing improved yield forecasts
using weather and other information. The statistical properties of a
nonexistent future system is speculative, as properly pointed out by ECON
Incorporated, however, the early LACIE goals were to achieve 90 percent
accuracy with 90 percent confidence (i.e., 90 percent accuracy at least
9 times out of 10, with no bias). According to the ECON analysis, if
LACIE achieves these goals, the resulting world production forecast
variances (given the above accuracy of area measurements) will be less
10
than for the current USDA forecasts made in May, compared with 8.8 percent
under the USDA system), but will be about the same at the end of the har-
vest season (i.e., 2 percent or less for the November-December forecast/
estimate). This represents some improvement in information concerning
the U.S. crop, and a very substantial improvement in rest-of-the-world
information.
Another factor in comparing a remote sensing data-based system
with current systems is the timeliness of reports, and the time from mea-
surement to publication of an estimate or forecast. In the United States,
the USDA publishes an initial forecast of the coming year's wheat pro-
duction in December, when all winter wheat plantings are complete. Then,
monthly forecasts are made starting in May and continuing through the har-
vest season. Preliminary final crop estimates are made in December and
then revised periodically as more information becomes available. The
monthly forecasts are released on the 10th to the 12th of the month, and
are based on a mail survey plus probability sample surveys that were ini-
tiated on about the 23rd of the previous month. Thus, the time from start
of the measurement process to publication is approximately 20 days.
A two-satellite remote sensing system will take measurements of
each area samples every 9 days, depending on cloud cover conditions. At
present, there is no formal and routine system established for processing,
estimating, and publishing crop forecast information, but presumably, at
least monthly national forecasts will be made. Thus, this will be at
least comparable to the current U.S. system, and far superior to the
current information availability for the rest of the world.
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Use of Potential Improvements
The wheat production/marketing system is composed of
(1) Grain production
(2) Assembly, collection, and storage
(3) Domestic marketing and use
(4) International marketing and use.
Grain Production
Wheat production in temperate zones is of two types:
— Winter wheat which is planted just prior to the winter
season (September-November in the U.S.)> and harvested
in early summer (June-July in the U.S.)
Spring wheat which is planted in the Spring (march-
May in the U.S.), and harvested in late summer
through early autumn (August-October in the U.S.).
During the production process, the farmer has a series of basic
decisions to make:
How much acreage to plant
— The amount of fertilizer and pesticide to apply to
the growing crop
— Irrigation decisions where this ,is applicable
— Whether to continue production or change to an
alternative crop during the growing season
— When to harvest (or whether to abandon)
When to sell his crop (how long to store).
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Winter wheat is typically grown in the more humid production
areas, therefore decisions regarding plowing down a crop and planting an
alternative are more applicable than in spring wheat areas. Spring wheat
is typically grown in dryer areas where the cropping alternatives are
fewer than in the more humid areas. However, decisions to change crops
or to abandon acreage are not taken lightly—conditions have to be severe
and the future outlook very bleak—because a substantial sunk investment
is at stake. Furthermore, if the producer abandons his crop, he is fore-
going a cash income that is usually required to pay for production costs
that have already been incurred, e.g., pesticides, seed, and fertilizer.
These producer decisions are based on
Anticipated wheat prices
— Anticipated prices of alternative crops
— Anticipated and actual growing conditions
— Anticipated and actual input costs.
Because a high percentage of the U.S. wheat crop is exported, world con-
ditions heavily influence U.S. wheat prices. Of primary impact is the
anticipated production in the U.S. and in other parts of the world, in-
cluding production for both export and for domestic consumption. Improved
and more timely information on both the U.S. and the rest-of-the-world
production should allow improved price forecasting. Indeed, it should
make for less violent price fluctuation, because production uncertainty
is one major factor in causing price volatility. Therefore, improved in-
formation on actual and anticipated wheat production throughout the world
should enable wheat producers collectively to make improved planting and
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other production decisions.* Production acreage should become more
closely attuned to market requirements. . Thus, the uncertainty resulting
from unknown market conditions should be lessened. This leaves then the
vagaries of nature as the primary source of uncertainty for the producer.
Even the market impacts of natural occurrences should be somewhat lessened
with improved worldwide production information, because producers in one
area then will be able to adjust somewhat for conditions in another area.
Assembly, Collection, and Storage
As grain leaves the farm it flows through a series of nearby
and more distant assembly and storage points. This system of points, or
elevators, begins with the nearby country elevator. Then the grain may
move to a regional elevator and/or a terminal elevator. The regional ele-
vators collect grain from the country elevators, and the terminal elevators
collect from both country and regional facilities. The terminal facilities
are normally located in areas of major use or at major shipping points.
These are interconnected by the transportation system—highway, rail, and
water. For wheat, another set of elevators is important, as well: the
export elevator which collects grain from all of the above and loads it
onto ships. These vessels then unload into port elevators at the receiv-
ing ports. From these port elevators the grain moves into the internal
distribution system of the receiving country.
* The term "actual and anticipated" is used, becduse some planting and
harvesting takes place continuously in the world because of the sea-
sonal variation in the Different regions.
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Storage or inventory decisions may be made at any or all of
these points.* Storage is important because harvest occurs over a rela-
tively short period, while use is relatively constant throughout the year.
There are two major types of inventory decisions—one involves the building
of inventory for use (i.e., the grain inventories of a flour miller), and
the second involves building inventories in anticipation of future market
conditions (or speculation).
Farmers may hold inventory either on the farm or at the local or
regional elevator. Elevator operators at various points may hold inventory
on their own account, or on the account of a supplier or a customer. Thus,
there are many inventory decision-makers in the system, some sophisticated,
such as the major grain trading companies, and others relatively naive.
Again the inventory decision is predicated on anticipated supplies
and prices of grain. If these conditons are known in advance with greater
certainty than at present, then more rational or effective inventory de-
cisions can be made. Currently, inventory buildup may be either too large
or too small for future conditions. Too large inventories are costly in
terms of storage costs and when they are sold, may depress prices. Too
small inventories may mean restricted future consumption and higher prices.
Furthermore, inventory holding is subject to substantial risk of
price change. To offset this risk, inventories are frequently hedged.
That is, in its simplest form, cash or spot transactions such as purchases
for inventory, are offset by counter-transactions in the futures market.
A purchase on the cash market is thus offset by the sale of contracts for
* Host export elevators operate on a basis of rapid turnover and thus
do not hold inventories for long periods.
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future delivery in the futures market. When inventory is sold, the
futures contracts are cancelled out by purchasing them back. As price
levels in both markets are expected to move somewhat in concert, the in-
ventory holder thus is afforded some protection from future price change.
Again, information of improved reliability concerning expected
future conditions will enable inventory holders to make better hedging
decisions and will lessen their degree of risk to some extent. In fact,
if sufficiently reliable information could be provided that future price
levels could be known with a reasonable degree of certainty, the practice
of hedging could be reduced. This occurred when price support programs
were at their peak in the United States. The need for hedging was reduced,
because future prices were known with reasonable certainty. This alone
could reduce the cost of inventory holding, because hedging is not without
cost.
Domestic and International Marketing
The mechanics of domestic and international grain marketing are
much the same in the essentials. However, international marketing is much
more complex in that it is done at long distances, with longer lengths of
time between transaction and delivery, in different currencies, and with
somewhat different trading rules and terms. Within the United States, grain
may begin its movement to market either as the result of a fixed order, or
on speculative action, with the seller hoping to make a sale before the
grain actually arrives at its destination. Orders and transactions may
be made by various means—uhey may be carried out by agents of buyers and
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sellers on the trading floor of various formal markets, such as the Chicago
Board of Trade. Or, they may be placed by buyers at the offices of grain
traders or commissionmen. Or, they may be negotiated over long periods
of time.
Buyers may be millers, animal feeders, their representatives,
or middlemen. Sellers may be producers (rarely), agricultural cooperatives,
commercial grain traders, or individual independent elevator operators
(however, most of the major elevators are owned or operated by grain
traders or cooperatives).
Grain trading is a highly competitive marketing situation in
which both parties attempt to establish conditions and terms to their
best advantage. In this type of process, timely and accurate information
is indispensible. This is why the major trading companies have established
their own information systems.
The United States tends to be a residual supplier to the world
market. In this role, because it is the world's largest export supplier,
the United States is often looked upon as a "gap" filler, rather than a
consistent trading partner. In times of stress, because the United States
has such a large supply that is normally available to the world market
without restriction, those in short supply can look to the United States
to meet their needs. This attitude has perhaps contributed to price
fluctuations in recent years. There are those who believe that increas-
ing the availability of supply information will increase the tendency of
others to view the United States in that role. The argument is that
U.S. producers and marketers might be at a relative disadvantage
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compared with their current position of having superior information, and
they might have to suffer the consequences of increased price fluctuation
and price risk. The ECON analysis does not deal directly with this argu-
ment. At first glance, it would appear that this type of discussion is
more pertinent to information dissemination than information collection
and development. However, it is unlikely that other countries will allow
information to be collected without receiving the results in a timely
fashion. The ECON reports do point out that foreign users of the informa-
tion will likely benefit to a greater extent than U.S. users, but both
parties do benefit substantially. Furthermore, in such classic examples
as the "Russian wheat deal" of 1972, it is clear that the United States
)
was at a disadvantage from lack of information about conditions in the
USSR. Had such information been available earlier, the market would have
reacted earlier to this information and prices would have risen gradually
during the marketing season. Of course, neither party could have accurately
foreseen the adverse weather conditions that were going to prevail in the
U.S. and elsewhere during the planting and harvesting seasons of that year,
making for shorter-than-normal supplies (nor would the proposed LANDSAT,
system assist greatly in developing such information).
In Battelle's opinion, increased information availability will
be unlikely to worsen the position of the U.S. in the grain trade in an
absolute sense. It may benefit others relatively more, but both the U.S.
and the rest of the world will likely gain. Improved decisions by both
exporters and importers might lead to greater price stability, improved
production efficiency, and improved inventory management.
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Benefits of Improved Information
The benefits of improved worldwide wheat production information
derive from
— Reduced price fluctuation and somewhat lower average
prices because of more perfect information about actual
and potential wheat supplies on a worldwide basis
— Reduced uncertainty for producers and for inventory
holders, again because of more perfect information
about supply
Reduced tendency to hold purely speculative inventories
—inventory decisions will be made given a "truer" in-
dication of the actual state of supply
— Improved production planning.
The ECON Concepts
In the ECON analysis, it is proposed, that with improved infor-
mation, the supply curve for wheat, following any given harvest, will
shift outward from its current position, i.e., increase. Thus, for any
given harvest, a greater quantity of wheat will be offered to the market
at any price level, or, in other words, offering prices will be lower
for any given quantity offered. The mechanism by which this will come
about derives from the above. That is, costs of production and storage
will be somewhat lower. And, because of the reduced uncertainty, producers
and marketers will be willing to accept a lower return on investments and
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lower profits (uncertainty leads to higher risk, and a portion of profit
normally is to compensate for risk assumption).
Benefits in the ECON analyses are measured basically in terms
of changes in consumers' and producers' surpluses. These are abstract
concepts that are basically defined as follows:
— Consumers' surplus is the benefit to consumers as a group
derived from the fact that, for any given market price, there
will be some consumers willing to purchase at higher prices, if
they are forced to buy at these prices. Thus they derive a
"windfall" gain from the lower market price. If the market
price is lowered, consumers' surplus increases and vice versa,
assuming a demand curve that slopes downward to the right.
Producers' surplus is a somewhat similar concept and re-
fers to the collective benefit that derives from the fact
that, for any given market price, there will be some pro-
ducers willing to sell at lower prices. Thus, they derive
what can be termed a "windfall" profit from the market
price. Reductions in market price reduce producers'
surplus, and vice versa, assuming a supply curve that
slopes upward to the right.
Thus, for any change in market-price levels, the producers' and consumers'
surpluses change in opposite directions. These concepts relate to total
social welfare or social benefits. The net benefit to society depends on
the relative shapes and slopes of the demand and supply curves.
The application of these concepts to the measurement of benefits
from improved crop information was questioned by the reviewers of the ECON
20
work. Professor L. Thurow offered that other benefits might also be
s\
measured, such as the benefit to society of preventing reductions in
consumption below some critical level.* Thurow also felt that real income
effects of changes in the prices of wheat should be taken into account
as well. Dr. C.W.J. Granger, while being uncomfortable with the general
concept, noted that "the fact that the measure used is accorded wide
approval by economists does give it some real status and cannot be lightly
dismissed".**
Quantitative Estimates
In quantitative terms, over the long term, ECON estimates from
one of its two models—the Worldwide Wheat Model—that U.S. consumers
will benefit $287 million per year (in 1975 dollars) from average lower
wheat prices. At the same time, U.S. producers are expected to lose appox-
imately $393 million per year because of these lower prices. Offsetting
part of this producer loss are an estimated $280 million in production
efficiency gains because of improved information. Thus, net benefits to
U.S. society are approximately $174 million per year in 1975 dollars.
ECON estimates that on the order of 10 years will be required to realize
this annual benefit level.
The U.S. is expected to further benefit through increased trade
revenues to the extent of some $334 million per year—these increased
* Thurow, L.C., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Letter and Memo-
randum to Dr. A.C. Robinson, Battelle's Columbus Laboratories, March
12, 1976.
** Granger, C.W.J., University of California, San Diego, Letter to
Dr. A.C. Robinson, Battelle's Columbus Laboratories, March 1976, p 8.
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revenues are not directly additive with the above benefits. Further
analysis will be required to determine net benefits to U.S. society from
increased trade revenues that are in the same terms as the consumer and
producer surplus gains estimated above. The specifics of these benefits
will depend upon the character of the U.S. economy at the time, however,
general benefits from increased trade are
An increased final demand for U.S. output that can lead
to higher employment and increased domestic earnings
— Increased purchasing power for foreign goods that
are imported
— Monetary effects, i.e., an increase in the domestic money
supply resulting from an inflow of money to the U.S. (un-
less offset by foreign purchases or other outflows)
An increase in the demand for the U.S. dollar relative
to other currencies, that will strengthen the U.S.
foreign exchange position.
These benefits may be offset by
— An increased rate of depletion of U.S. natural resources
— The possibility of an inflationary effect of increasing
the money supply, depending on the character of the
economy at the time the increase takes place.
It is also important to note that the rest of the world gains
from increased information, probably to a much greater extent than does
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the United States. However, ECON, in its later work, does not make an
estimate of the magnitude of these rest-of-the-world effects.
In its second set of analyses, the Bradford-Kelejian-Andrews
(B-K-A) models, ECON attempted to measure the impact of improved information
in a somewhat different manner. These models incorporate the concept that
less-than-perfect information results in an economic loss, through improper
inventory decisions made because of wrong perceptions of the true state of
supply at any point in time. Improvements in the information base that
will result in less imperfect information than under current conditions
will result in a lesser loss than is now experienced. In this case,
benefit is a negative loss, and is measured in about the same terms as
before, i.e., consumer surplus plus producer surplus minus the cost of
inventory holding. The results of the B-K-A analysis are more complex than
with the previous model and are presented with several alternative possi-
bilities. However, in their "standard" case, they estimate the loss to
the U.S. under current conditions as $40 million (1975 dollars), and the
loss to the rest of the world as $393 million, or a total of $433 million.
If the crop measurement errors are reduced by 50 percent, the net loss to
the U.S. from still imperfect information would be $10 million and to the
rest of the world $138 million, or a total of $148 million. Thus, the
net benefit (or reduction in loss) would be some $30 million to the United
States and $295 million to the rest of the world, or a total of $325
million. It should be noted that the B-K-A analyses relate only to the
impacts of improved inventory decision-making (resulting from an improved
perception of the true situation at any point in time).
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The reviewers generally felt that these are relatively reason-
able results but that it would be more realistic to present ranges of
potential benefits rather than point estimates. Also, they generally
felt that the sensitivity of the results to various simplifying assumptions
made during the analysis should be investigated before final benefit
estimates are made. ECON is now carrying out this further analysis.
Alternatives
Some of the reviewers, Thurow especially, expressed concern
that the ECON analysis paid too little attention to alternative means
of achieving benefits than through improved information.* One alterna-
tive suggested was a change in policy regarding foreign access to U.S.
supplies of grain. In particular it was suggested that foreign access
be restricted only to the portion of supply that is not required to meet
anticipated U.S. domestic demand. This significant change in the tradi-
tional free market policy of the United States would not be cost free.
Without further detailed analysis one cannot compare these costs and their
resulting benefits to those of an improved information system.
* Thurow, Op.Cit.
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THE ECON MODELS
ECON Incorporated has developed and presented two sets of econo-
metric models dealing with the measurement of potential benefits of improved
wheat crop information. Both of these models are complex, but both also
are simplified versions of rea]ity, as is the case with any econometric
model. Simplifications have to be made to accomodate ease and cost of
calculations and manipulations in the models. In the B-K-A inventory
decision models, some effort was made to determine the impact of some
simplifying assumptions but not others. In the worldwide wheat model no
sensitivity analysis was performed. ECON is carrying out further work in
this direction.
The discussion of the models is even further simplified in this
paper. This discussion is taken both from the original reports and from
Dr. P. Kochanowski's abstract of these reports*.
The Bradford-Kelejain-Andrews Model
The Model
As discussed earlier, this model relates to the benefits that
can be expected from improved inventory decision-making given improved
crop information that will result in an improved perception of the true
state of supply (considering domestic and foreign demand and supply). In
particular, the model generates benefits by showing that improved in-
formation will lead to a pattern of inventory holding such that the variance
* Kochanowski, P., NASA (on leave from the University of Indiana),
Draft of Abstract of ECON Incorporated Studies, April 16, 1976.
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or instability of wheat supply will be reduced. Information improvements
are in the form of reduced variance in crop forecasting or estimating
errors (i.e., less variance in over-and underestimation of the upcoming
crop). This reduction in supply variance leads to somewhat lower average
prices. In addition, the average level of inventories will be somewhat
less, making for lower total storage costs. These changes then lead to
changes in the level of consumer and producer surplus, which taken together
with storage costs result in welfare benefits to the United States and the
rest of the world.
A simplified explanation of the basic steps involved is
Action
1. Improved information from remote
sensing
2. Improved crop forecasts
3. Different time pattern and level
of inventory buildups and
depletions
4. Reduction in the variance of
supply
Result
Improved crop forecasts (reduction
in the variance of crop forecasts
errors)
A different time pattern and level
of inventory buildups and deple-
tions, since crop forecasts are
inputs into inventory holding
decisions
Reduction in the variance of the
supply of the commodity available
for consumption
Welfare gains (given certain mathe-
matical properties of the welfare
function).
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Critique
This model was reviewed by Dr. I. Horowitz* and Dr. L. Thurow.**
Both reviewers commented that they considered this analysis to be competent
and sophisticated, leading to reasonable results. However, they felt that
improvements could be made in the approach and in the model itself.
Results. While the reviewers indicated that they felt the results
were reasonable they both were concerned about the,"certainty with which
the results were reported". They felt that the sensitivity of the results
to the basic assumptions and data inputs should be explored in much greater
depth than was indicated in the reports. It is Battelle's understanding
that ECON is now carrying out some of these sensitivity analyses. In
particular, both reviewers believe that there is a nonlinearity in the
actual situation that has not been taken into account in the model, which
assumes a linear form for simplicity. The model contains the further
assumption that inventory holders will act to maximize social welfare in
opposition to their own welfare or profit, that Horowitz, in particular,
questions.
Welfare Function. Both reviewers questioned the B-K-A welfare
function that utilized consumer and producer surplus as the sole indicator
of social welfare. Thurow suggests that there are additional benefits to
more stable prices and to providing an assurance that consumption will not
* Horowitz, I., Department of Justice (on leave from the University of
Florida), Letter to Dr. A. C. Robinson, Battelle's Columbus Laboratories,
** Thurow, Op.Cit.
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fall below some critical level. These other benefits have not been taken
into account in the model. Horowitz goes on to suggest some different
approaches to a welfare (objective) function for use in the model.
Inventory Decision Model. The B-K-A model utilizes an optimi-
zation rule for inventory holding that essentially states that inventories
are to be held to the point at which the anticipated marginal revenue of
an additional unit is equal to the marginal cost of storing that unit.
Both reviewers commented on this rule—Thurow felt that the estimates of
storage cost were too low, but generally accepted the rule. Horowitz,
however, argues that this rule was inadequate based on a large currently
available body of uncertainty-related literature. He again suggested
some alternative approaches that he believed could be implemented within
the framework of the model.
Other Comments. Thurow suggested that alternatives to improved
information for achieving price and consumption smoothing, such as policy
changes, might be explored. Whether such approaches would be more
efficient than developing improved information is not known without further
analysis.
Both reviewers questioned the probability distributions used in
the model regarding forecast errors. The question is whether in reality
such errors are truly random and whether their probability distribution
is symmetrical.
Thurow further commented, that of the two models, the B-K-A is
the correct general approach for evaluating the impact of improved information.
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Worldwide Wheat Model
The Model
This is an econometric model of wheat supply and demand, con-
sidering the United States and the Rest of the World (R.O.W.) as the two
parties in the world market. Basically, the model shows that improved
forecasting will result in more realistic futures prices that in turn
will lead to an outward shift (increase) in the supply of wheat available
for consumption from any harvest. This results from a lower average level
of inventory holding, and from producer efficiencies because of the im-
proved information. The following simplified steps show the working of
the model.
Action
1. Improved information
2. Improved crop forecasts
3. Changes in wheat futures
4. Changes in:
Demand for Commercial Stocks
(U.S.)
Area harvested (U.S.v
Area harvested (R.O.W.)
Results
Improved crop forecasts
Changes in the pattern and level of
wheat futures prices from a wheat
futures price adjustment equation
Changes in:
Demand for Commercial Stocks (U.S.)
Area harvested (U.S.)
Area Harvested (R.O.W.)
Expansion of supply of wheat avail-
able for consumption
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Action Results
5. Expansion of supply available Decrease in equilibrium wheat prices
for consumption and increase in equilibrium wheat
quantity
6. Decreases in equilibrium wheat Net benefits in terms of producers'
prices and increase in equili- and consumers' surpluses.
brium wheat quantity
Critique
This model was reviewed by Dr. L. Thurow* and Dr. C. Granger.*
They tended to differ in their evaluation of the usefulness of this approach
—Granger felt that this was a sound piece of work with acceptable and
worthwhile estimates of benefits, while Thurow disagreed with the model
of wheat supplies and demand as well as the technique for measuring bene-
fits. Comments tended to group around five subject areas: the measures
of social welfare employed in the model; the probability distribution
used for crop forecast errors; the export demand elasticities; improved
information versus improved forecasts; and nonsymmetrical cost functions
with respect to crop forecast errors.
Welfare Measurement. Both reviewers were uncomfortable with the
use of changes in consumers' and producers' surplus as measures of social
benefit. Thurow stated that the technique is correct only for small changes
and argued that the real income effects of changes in wheat prices should
not be ignored. Granger, on the other hand, while not completely accepting
* Thurow, Op.Git.; Granger, Op.Cit.
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the technique, did not offer alternatives and stated that since the concept
is generally accepted by economists it does have some status.
Probability Distribution of Forecast Error. The model assumes
a normal distribution for forecast errors—this distribution becomes an
input into benefit calculations and thus is important. Granger generally
accepted this approach, but felt that it could be refined somewhat.
Thurow, on the other hand, doubted this basic assumption and went on to
indicate that the signs of the errors as pointed out in the report did
not indicate randomness—the December forecasts compared with the September
forecasts tended to err on the high side many more times than on the low
side. He also felt that the calculations should take into account that,
while weather may be normally distributed, crop yields resulting from
weather changes are not—for example, dry weather at some point in the
growth cycle may have long-term impacts that cannot be corrected by later
wetter weather.
Export Demand Elasticities. ECON did not explicitly determine
export demand elasticities in the model. Thurow felt that because the
U.S. is a residual supplier for some countries and a main supplier for
others these groups of countries should be treated separately. For ex-
ample, the European demand is small and depends on their domestic supply
conditions; therefore, their demand has virtually zero price elasticity—
i.e., they will take a given quantity without regard to price. On the
other hand, for other countries, price is an important factor in determining
the quantity demanded from the U.S.
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Information Versus Forecasts. If improved information is not
used effectively it does not necessarily result in improved forecasts.
Granger points out that there are alternative ways to improve forecasts,
and that NASA should be concerned not only with improving informational
inputs, but also with the development of a more effective "complete fore-
cast package".
Nonsymmetric Cost Functions. Granger felt that an interesting
aspect of the ECON model was its use of nonsymmetric cost functions with
regard to forecast errors. That is, if a forecast error leads to market
shortages in one period, these shortages will not be completely made up .
in subsequent periods. Therefore, crop overestimates may lead to greater
costs than underestimates. While these functions were not estimated in
the ECON work, Granger felt that such estimates might be helpful to NASA
system designers.
Overall Evaluation
As indicated earlier, the two reviewers were of opposite opinions
regarding the validity and worth of this model. Thurow did not accept the
approach. He felt that because U.S. price supports and crop controls
existed over the period of data used for estimating supply and demand
functions, these estimates were not valid. He felt that the modelers
failed to take these market constraints into account and, therefore, their
point estimates of benefits could not be accepted. He suggested that the
report be expanded to provide a variety of estimates for benefits allowing
supply and demand elasticities to vary. Furthermore, while he basically
32
accepted the concept of an outward shift in the supply curve (which is
at the heart of the ECON analysis), he criticized ECON for not indicating
how this is calculated in the model.
Granger generally accepted the ECON work, while offering
suggestions for expansion. He based his judgment on generally used statis-
tical evaluations of the model coefficients and estimates. Thus, he
generally was satisfied with the statistical confidence levels of the model.
Both reviewers were of the opinion that the empirical results
should be subjected to sensitivity tests and the results reported. Both
felt that range rather than point estimates of benefits should be provided
based on these sensitivity analyses. Both, however, felt that the
benefits obtained were reasonable, and Granger further pointed out that
"further refinements of the study may lead to changes in the actual
figure for the potential benefits of the new system. I feel that any
revised figures are as equally likely to be changed upwards as downwards,
and that it is most unlikely that benefits will be anything but considerably
greater than projected costs".*
* Granger, Op.Cit. p 9.
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COMPARISON OF ECON AND EARTH
RESOURCES SURVEY STUDIES
The Earth Resources Survey Study
The Earth Resources Survey (ERS) Benefit-Cost Study was prepared
by the Earth Satellite Corporation and the Booz-Allen Applied Research
Corporation for the U.S. Department of the Interior, Geological Survey
(Contract No. 135-9). The report (Vol. VI) was presented on November 22,
1974. This report was concerned with four types of impacts from a
satellite survey system:
Distributional Impacts
'. Environmental Impacts
Social Impacts
International Impacts.
Of these, only the international impact analysis is directly comparable
with the ECON studies.
This study concentrated on international trade impacts and impacts
on the U.S. balance of payments from (1) exportation of this new technology
and (2) changes in agricultural trade resulting from application of the
improved information. The study considered primarily agricultural trade,
concentrating on wheat and rice, with particular emphasis on wheat.
The study considered a wide variety of situations, cases, and
assumptions. An "excess supply-demand framework" was used for much of the
analysis that incorporated estimates of impacts on consumer welfare and on
the volume of trade. A quantitative model was constructed, examining two
cases of wheat exports:
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(1) U.S. trade with Western Europe, Japan, and developing
nations
(2) U.S. trade with the USSR and the People's Republic of
China (PRC).
The specific data used and details of the calculations are not given, but
the geometric and algebraic arguments are clearly presented.
The ERS study measures consumer welfare changes as changes in
the total value (price times quantity) of product (wheat) consumed in the
United States. Increases in total value of consumption are counted as in-
creases in consumer welfare and vice versa. Changes in trade are calculated
as changes in total value (price times quantity) of exports from the U.S.
to the area of concern.
Some of the key basic assumptions of the analysis are:
(1) The ERS system will have the capability of a 10 to 30
percent improvement in the accuracy of publicly avail-
able information
(2) The accuracy of currently available information on pro-
duction in the U.S., Western Europe, Japan, and
developing countries is now comparable in all of these
areas; i.e., importers in those countries have comparable
information to that available to exporters in the U.S.
(3) Importers in the USSR and the PRC now have more accurate
private information on production in those areas, than
is, available to U.S. exporters.
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(4) Overestimates of foreign production have an equal but
opposite effect as underestimates and each is expected
to occur about one-half of the time—i.e., the "loss"
function is symmetrical.
(5) In the quantitative analysis, wheat was initially priced
at $4.00 per bushel, the elasticity of domestic demand
was assumed to be -0.1 and of foreign import demand -0.5.
The results of the wheat analyses were:
(1) The U.S. would lose annually a total of $2.8 to $7.4
million (unadjusted for cloud cover) in wheat trade and
consumer welfare to Western Europe, Japan, and the de-
veloping nations from the use of improved information.
(2) The U.S. would gain $5.3 to $16.1 million annually in
consumer welfare and trade with the USSR and the PRC.
(3) Net gains to the U.S. from improved inventory management
range from $2.5 to $8.7 million. Adjustments for cloud
cover make the net benefit in wheat $0.4 to $1.5 million
for a one-satellite system and $2.5 to $8.7 million for
a two-satellite system.
From this analysis, the conclusion is reached that the U.S.
should improve publicly available information on foreign wheat production
only to the level of accuracy of information already* available to im-
porters. Carrying the accuracy to higher levels will decrease benefits
to the exporters, i.e., the U.S.
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Comparison with ECON Studies
There are several substantial differences between the two sets
of studies:
(1) The ECON studies are more quantitative, more complex, more
exhaustive, and the quantitative parameters and co-efficients
appear to be derived from a more extensive statistical ana-
lysis than the ERS studies.
(2) On the other hand, the ERS studies are logical constructs
and consider a wider range of assumptions and potential
circumstances than do the ECON studies.
(3) The measures of benefit are somewhat different, especially
with regard to consumer benefit—ECON uses changes in con-
sumers' surplus as a measure and ERS uses changes in the
value of consumption, termed consumer welfare, as a measure
—the impact that this will make on final estimates of
total benefit is difficult to say, and depends on the
specific shape and slope of the demand and supply curves
used in the analyses.
(4) In addition to consumer surplus, the ECON studies also
consider producers' surplus in their measure of benefits.
(5) A major difference is that the ECON studies consider a
larger number of avenues to achieve benefit than do the
ERS studies—in addition to price and quantity changes
due to more accurate information leading to improved
judgments of the "true" expected import demand position,
ECON considers such impacts as
37
(a) Changes in the export and domestic supply curve
for the U.S. resulting from production efficiencies
due to improved information
(b) Changes in the pattern and level of inventory build-
ups in the U.S. and depletions due to improved
information
(c) Changes in the variance of supply
(d) Changes in the perception of import demand based on
improved information
(e) Influence of an asymmetric loss function; i.e., that
over and underestimates of demand have different impacts
(see p. 31).
(6) The ERS studies te.id to focus on inventory management in
the importing countries that can be influenced by improved
information, while the ECON studies tend to concentrate on
production and inventory management in the U.S., relating
to both domestic consumption and export.
Both of these are interesting sets of studies. In summary, the
basic differences seem to resolve to one of approach to the problem, and
the fact that while the ERS discussion considers a wide variety of factors
and possible impacts, the ERS quantitative analysis really considers a
lesser range of impact possibilities than in the ECON studies. It is
difficult to comment on the relative "accuracy" of the alternative estimates,
given the information available to Battelle. However, it appears that the
ERS studies understate the benefit picture, assuming that the ECON hypo-
theses and analyses are at all correct. This is particularly true
considering potential benefits to the U.S. as an exporter. The ERS studies
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concentrate on the potential actions and impacts of importers, while the
ECON studies consider the actions of importers, export inventory holders,
and producers. In both analyses, the rest of the world tends to benefit
to a greater extent than does the U.S., but in the ECON studies, the U.S.
benefit is of much greater magnitude than in the ERS studies.
The ERS report does point out one important factor. Both sets
of studies were conducted under the basic assumption that the major con-
sideration in determining import demand is the difference between demand
and domestic supply in the importing countries. In some important cases,
such as the USSR and the PRC, other considerations, such as foreign ex-
change balances, other planning targets, and other decision factors may
be very important in determining actual import demand. In this type of
situation, improved information on actual and expected production is less
important in estimating expected demand than in those situations where
the decision is based mainly on supply/demand considerations.
In conclusion, the ECON studies, taken together, tend to provide
i
a more comprehensive estimate of potential benefits from a LANDSAT system
in the case of wheat, than does the ERS study of international impacts.
However, neither set of studies provides a truly complete estimate. As
one of the reviewers of the ECON studies stated, it is likely that actual
total benefits will be even greater than those estimated.
